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I. GONZALES V. OREGON: HISTORY AND DECISION 
On November 9, 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft 
issued an interpretive rule (hereinafter “November 2001 Interpretive 
Rule” or “Interpretive Rule”) stating that “assisting suicide is not a 
‘legitimate medical purpose’ within the meaning of 21 CFR 
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§ 1306.04.”1 The cited regulation requires all prescriptions for 
controlled substances to “be issued for a legitimate medical purpose 
by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice.”2 The Attorney General’s directive purported 
to make the prescribing, dispensing, or administering of a controlled 
substance to assist in a suicide a violation of the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA).3  
To prescribe controlled substances a physician must be registered 
with the appropriate federal agency, currently the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).4 Issuing a prescription for an invalid purpose 
can result in revocation of the physician’s registration and subject the 
physician to civil and criminal penalties.5 Based on the wording of 
the Interpretive Rule itself,6 Attorney General Ashcroft clearly 
intended to revoke the registration of any Oregon physician who 
prescribed a controlled substance under the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act (ODWDA)7 for the purpose of assisting a patient in 
hastening their death. This state statute authorizes a physician to 
comply with the request of a terminally ill, mentally competent 
patient for a prescription for a lethal dose of medication, which the 
patient can ingest if the dying process becomes intolerable.8 If the 
Interpretive Rule had been implemented, there is little doubt that it 
effectively would have nullified the ODWDA, as few, if any, 
physicians would have risked violating the Attorney General’s rule. 
On January 17, 2006, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling, with the 
majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, concluded that the 
Interpretive Rule was an invalid exercise of the Attorney General’s 
 
 1. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 
2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306). The “Interpretive Rule” issued by Attorney 
General Ashcroft, which was to take effect immediately, was promulgated in the Federal 
Register without prior notice to or comments by interested parties. 
 2. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2005). 
 3. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2000), is Title II of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 
 4. See 21 U.S.C. § 823; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b)(2) (2003) (oversight of physician 
registration delegated to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator). 
 5. See 21 U.S.C. § 824. 
 6. See the third and fourth paragraphs of the supplementary information to 66 Fed. Reg. 
56,608. 
 7. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–127.995 (2003). 
 8. Id. § 127.805. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/2
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authority.9 Specifically, the Court held that the CSA does not grant 
the Attorney General authority to prohibit physicians from 
prescribing controlled substances to assist in hastening death if such a 
practice is authorized by state law.10 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision resolved one of the critical 
legal issues relating to the controversy over assistance in hastening 
death. However, other important issues, both legal and moral, remain. 
First, the decision underscores the fact that there is no consensus 
among health care professionals about the precise boundaries of the 
legitimate practice of medicine. While many physicians firmly 
believe that, under appropriate circumstances, assistance in hastening 
death is an appropriate means of addressing a patient’s needs, other 
physicians are emphatic in condemning the practice. Second, there is 
significant disagreement regarding the appropriate process for 
determining the boundaries of medical practice. In particular, there is 
disagreement about the extent to which the government should be 
involved in drawing these boundaries as well as the proper allocation 
of regulatory authority between and within state and federal 
governments. 
We begin discussion of these problems with a summary of the 
controversy over legalized assistance in hastening death and a 
description of how that controversy led to Gonzales v. Oregon.11 We 
then review the Gonzales decision, explaining what it did and did not 
resolve. Looking to how these issues should be analyzed in the 
future, we will explain why a fundamental distinction currently 
embedded in the law is unhelpful in analysis of the legitimacy of 
assistance in hastening death. We will argue that, correctly 
 
 9. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).  
 10. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925. This article will use the phrase “assistance in hastening 
death” to describe the practice authorized by the Oregon statute. The authors recognize that 
“assisted suicide” is the term often used to describe this practice. Our reluctance to use the 
phrase “assisted suicide” does not stem from any squeamishness or desire to use euphemisms, 
but rather reflects a desire to be accurate in our description. As discussed in more detail below, 
not only must the patient in Oregon be terminally ill prior to receiving a prescription for a lethal 
drug from her physician, but the patient maintains control of the process and may decide to 
forgo use of the prescription or the drug obtained via the prescription. Many do. Under these 
circumstances, the term “assisted suicide” can be misleading. No normative conclusion depends 
on use of our terminology.  
 11. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
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understood, assistance in hastening death is properly regarded as a 
medical practice, or, more broadly stated, that a physician 
legitimately may assist in various ways in helping to bring about the 
death of a terminally ill patient who has explicitly and competently 
requested this assistance from the physician. In making this 
argument, we suggest how these and other disputes over medicine’s 
boundaries should be resolved.  
A. The Movement Toward Legalization of Assistance in Hastening 
Death and Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 
Recent decades have witnessed increased public debate over 
assistance in hastening death. A number of different factors account 
for the emergence of this debate. Among them are dramatically 
improved medical care and technology that allow an individual’s life 
to be prolonged, perhaps beyond the point where the individual 
wishes. “[W]ith the advance of medical technology capable of 
sustaining life well past the point where natural forces would have 
brought certain death in earlier times, cases involving the right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment have burgeoned.”12 In addition, 
patients have demanded, and physicians have given, greater 
deference to patients’ wishes regarding the scope of medical 
treatment. Respect for a patient’s autonomy has become an accepted 
principle in medical ethics.13 This respect for autonomy has grown to 
encompass a patient’s decisions about life-sustaining treatment.14 
The legal basis for recognition of the right to refuse or direct the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment has its foundations in the 
common-law right to be free from bodily touchings or invasions 
absent consent.15 Although there was some initial resistance to 
extending this right to include refusals of life-sustaining treatment, 
 
 12. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990). 
 13. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 57 (5th ed. 2001).  
 14. Id.  
 15. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), 
overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957) (“Every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and 
a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for 
which he is liable in damages.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/2
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the patient’s right to refuse such treatment has now become widely 
accepted, as both a moral and a legal right.16 Of course, the common 
law recognized no right to commit suicide. To the contrary, at 
common law suicide was a criminal offense.17 To reconcile the 
traditional rejection of suicide with acceptance of the right to be free 
of unwanted medical treatment, even when a refusal of treatment 
would likely result in death, courts have sometimes gone to great 
lengths to distinguish a refusal of treatment from suicide and assisted 
suicide.18 Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have tried to 
capture this distinction through use of the supposedly contrasting 
concepts of “letting die” and “killing,” with the former generally 
regarded as permissible and the latter as impermissible.19 
Withdrawals or withholdings of treatment are classified in the 
“letting die” category.20  
Along with recognition of a patient’s right to refuse treatment has 
come acceptance by the medical profession of alternative forms of 
care, designed not to cure, but, insofar as possible, to make the 
patient comfortable and maintain the quality of her life throughout 
her final illness. Palliative and hospice care were at first 
controversial, precisely because in providing such care a physician 
 
 16. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976), was the seminal decision on this issue, being the first 
state court decision to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment under certain 
conditions. Id. at 54. For a discussion of the legal regulation of withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment, see Lawrence O. Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, 
and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 94 (1993). 
 17. See Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 463 (1854); Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 
(1565); see also Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right? 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1 
(1985). 
 18. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620, 625–27 (Nev. 1990) (concerning a non-
terminal quadriplegic who desired removal of a respirator and the administration of a sedative 
but not to commit suicide); see also Georgia v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1989) 
(similar to McKay). 
 19. The Supreme Court utilized and endorsed the distinction between “killing” and 
“letting die” in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800–07 (1997), stating that withdrawals of life-
sustaining treatment merely allow the patient to die from the underlying disease. But see Cruzan 
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 295–97 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusal of 
life-sustaining treatment can constitute a “suicide”). We regard the distinction between “killing” 
and “letting die,” when used as a basis for distinguishing impermissible from permissible acts, 
as unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, not least because it tends to inhibit, rather than 
promote, consideration of relevant factors. See discussion infra note 113 (addressing this 
distinction and the role it plays in the debate over the boundaries of medical practice). 
 20. Gostin, supra note 16, at 95.  
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chooses to forgo further efforts at a cure.21 For those who believe that 
medical practice is limited to “healing,” palliative care appears to fall 
outside the boundaries of medicine. Nonetheless, palliative and 
hospice care are now nearly universally approved.22 Physicians and 
other health care professionals are today intimately involved in 
patient-directed withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment, not only with respect to advising patients about their 
condition and overseeing the withdrawal or withholding of treatment, 
but also with respect to providing alternative forms of care, including 
palliative care. 
Withdrawal or withholding of treatment will hasten death only for 
those individuals who are being sustained by such treatment. Many 
other individuals, including cancer patients, may face a protracted 
period of dying even when respirators and other life-preserving 
technology are not being utilized. For some of these patients, 
palliative care and the ability to refuse treatment do not adequately 
address their concerns. During their prolonged period of dying, they 
may endure a loss of functional capacity, unremitting pain and 
suffering, an inability to experience the simplest of pleasures, and 
long hours aware of the hopelessness of their condition. Some 
patients find this prospect unbearable. They desire a means to hasten 
their deaths.  
Most states have statutes in place that prohibit assisting a suicide, 
and, at least arguably, these statutes could be applied to any form of 
hastening death that is not classified by the courts as a withdrawal or 
withholding of treatment.23 Moreover, even in jurisdictions in which 
assisting a suicide is not expressly prohibited by statute, persons who 
assist in hastening death might be convicted of a common-law felony.  
 
 21. See generally Jill Rhymes, Hospice Care in America, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 369 
(1990) (discussing the history and modern day perception of hospice care as well as 
impediments to it). 
 22. Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Treatments of Last Resort: Choosing the Least 
Harmful Alternative, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488 (2000), available at http://www. 
annals.org/cgi/reprint/132/6/488.pdf. 
 23. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725–26 (1997) (discussing the assisted 
suicide laws of various states and observing that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment 
was not “transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide” by prior case law). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/2
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Recognition of the plight of patients who find themselves trapped 
in a lengthy and agonizing process of dying has resulted in efforts to 
overcome legal barriers that might prevent assistance in hastening 
death when there is no life-sustaining treatment to forgo. Proponents 
of assistance in hastening death have tried to enact statutes that would 
make the requested assistance for terminally ill patients explicitly 
lawful under specified conditions,24 and have brought suits alleging 
that statutes prohibiting such assistance are unconstitutional, at least 
as applied to terminally ill individuals.25  
Significantly, the vast majority of proposed statutes have 
envisaged an important role for physicians providing assistance in 
hastening death.26 Physician participation in the process is viewed as 
critical for several reasons. To begin, the patient’s decision to request 
assistance in hastening death should be fully informed. Many patients 
do not have the capacity to evaluate their own health condition 
accurately and objectively. Furthermore, they may be unaware of all 
the alternatives available to them, especially with respect to palliative 
care. In addition, of course, a patient should be competent to make a 
decision regarding treatment at the time of the request for assistance 
in hastening death, as well as free from inappropriate influences. 
Examination by and consultation with one or more physicians are 
 
 24. See infra note 26. 
 25. This, of course, was the gravamen of the complaint in Glucksberg. In that case, four 
physicians, three terminally ill patients, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals 
about end-of-life options, Compassion in Dying (now known as Compassion and Choices), 
brought suit alleging that Washington’s assisted suicide ban placed a constitutionally 
impermissible undue burden on the patients’ liberty interest in controlling the time and manner 
of their deaths. Id. at 708. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 735. 
Although some of the Justices indicated that in certain circumstances a statute banning assisted 
suicide might impose an intolerable burden on a patient’s freedom, id. at 752 (Stevens, J., 
concurring), it is safe to conclude, based on the Glucksberg precedent, that all or almost all of 
the existing state statutes prohibiting assisted suicide would withstand a constitutional 
challenge. Accordingly, most proponents of assistance in dying agree that legislation is now the 
only reliable method for ensuring that assistance in hastening death will not be subject to 
criminal prosecution.  
 26. See, e.g., H.B. 2313, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006); Assemb. B. 654, 2005–
2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); H.B. 168, 2005–2006 Sess. (Vt. 2005); H.B. 691, 90th Gen. 
Assem. (Ill. 1997); H.B. 371, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1996); see also Charles H. Baron et 
al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1 (1996); Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 119 (1994), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/331/2/119. 
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effective means of ensuring that the patient is competent and is 
making a truly voluntary choice. Ideally, the patient’s physician will 
also be sufficiently acquainted with the patient’s history, condition, 
and character to be able to engage the patient in a constructive 
dialogue regarding her decision. Finally, the person providing 
assistance should have the ability to provide a means of hastening 
death that is quick and painless. Only physicians can prescribe drugs 
with the appropriate efficacy.  
Efforts to enact legislation that would legalize assistance in 
hastening death have met determined resistance. Much of this 
resistance stems from religious objections to the practice.27 Other 
objections, however, reflect concerns that assistance in hastening 
death could not be effectively regulated and would have serious 
adverse consequences for many, including for those who do not 
desire such assistance. Moreover, opponents of legalization have 
maintained that the practice inevitably would be expanded to include 
euthanasia (including non-voluntary euthanasia), the quality of 
palliative care for all patients would deteriorate, patients would be 
manipulated or coerced into requesting assistance in hastening death, 
patients whose judgment was impaired would be allowed to request 
such assistance, and members of allegedly vulnerable groups (such as 
the elderly, women, members of racial and ethnic minorities) would 
be adversely affected in disproportionate numbers.28 Proponents of 
 
 27. Stephen James, Suicide Schism, SACRAMENTO NEWS & REV., June 2, 2005, 
http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/Content?oid=35650 (describing religious opposition 
to proposed California legislation). 
 28. For a discussion of some of the consequentialist, non-religious objections to legalizing 
assistance in hastening death, see John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 
J. CONTEM. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 361 (1997); Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The 
Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1 (1996); N.Y. YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN DEATH 
IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 9–22, 87–91 
(1994). The classical source for these arguments is Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views 
Against Proposed “Mercy-Killing” Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958). Proponents of 
legalization maintain that careful regulation will diminish, if not eliminate, predicted abuses. 
Baron et al., supra note 26, at 12–13. Proponents have also argued that some predicted abuses 
may not provide a sound argument against legalization. See, e.g., Ronald A. Lindsay, Should 
We Impose Quotas? Evaluating the “Disparate Impact” Argument Against Legalization of 
Assisted Suicide, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6 (2002) (providing a sharp critique of arguments that 
contend assistance in hastening death should not be made legal because of the threat it allegedly 
poses to vulnerable groups). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/2
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legal assistance in hastening death have tried to meet these objections 
by incorporating various procedural safeguards into their proposed 
legislation.29 
In 1994 the voters of Oregon, by referendum, adopted the 
ODWDA, the first and still the only statute in the United States 
expressly to permit assistance in hastening death.30 It authorized 
Oregon physicians to prescribe drugs for certain terminally ill 
patients requesting assistance in hastening their death.31 However, 
under the ODWDA, patients may seek, and physicians may provide, 
assistance in hastening death only after compliance with extensive 
procedural requirements.32 Eligibility is limited to patients who have 
received a diagnosis from their attending physician that they have a 
terminal illness that will cause their death within six months.33 
Patients must manifest a durable, verifiable desire for assistance: the 
patient must make two oral requests, separated by at least fifteen 
days, and one written request, signed in the presence of two 
witnesses.34 There are various procedural safeguards to ensure that 
the patient’s request is informed and truly voluntary, including 
consultation with and a confirming diagnosis by a second physician.35 
A patient must be referred to counseling if either the prescribing or 
the consulting physician believes he might be suffering from a 
psychological disorder that causes impaired judgment.36 The patient 
must ingest the prescribed drug—the physician may not administer 
it.37 Physicians must maintain detailed records of the process leading 
to the prescription, and these records must be shared with the Oregon 
Department of Human Services.38 The records also provide the basis 
for an annual public report.39  
 
 29. E.g., Baron et al., supra note 26. 
 30. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–127.995 (2003).  
 31. See id. § 127.815. 
 32. See id. §§ 127.805–127.897. 
 33. Id. § 127.800(12). 
 34. Id. § 127.840. 
 35. Id. § 127.800(8). 
 36. Id. §§ 127.815(e), 127.825. 
 37. Id. §§ 127.815(L), 127.880. 
 38. Id. § 127.865. 
 39. Id. § 127.865(3). 
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Whether because of these safeguards or because some of the 
concerns about the supposedly dire consequences of legalizing 
assistance in hastening death are simply unwarranted, none of the 
abuses predicted by some have materialized. The statute’s restrictions 
have been neither loosened nor broadened. There is no evidence that 
any patient has died other than in accordance with his or her own 
wishes. The number of patients seeking prescriptions under the 
statute has been both low and stable (sixty in 200440), and hastened 
death has not been used primarily by individuals who might be 
thought vulnerable to intimidation or abuse.41 Indeed, those choosing 
assisted death had, on average, a higher level of education and better 
medical coverage than terminally ill Oregonians who did not obtain 
assistance in dying.42 Women and members of disadvantaged racial 
minorities have not been adversely affected in disproportionate 
numbers.43 Rather, the overwhelming number of persons requesting 
assistance in hastening death are white and the gender of these 
patients reflects that of the general population.44 In addition, there is 
evidence that the quality of palliative care has actually improved in 
Oregon,45 possibly because of the increased attention the statute 
brings to end-of-life care. Perhaps most significantly, about one-third 
of the patients requesting assistance in dying ultimately decide not to 
use the prescribed drug.46 Under the statute, mentally competent, 
terminally ill patients remain securely in control of decision-making 
about their lives.  
In providing assistance in hastening death under the ODWDA, a 
physician is to exercise his or her professional judgment in 
prescribing the most effective drug.47 The drug prescribed in almost 
 
 40. OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON’S DEATH 
WITH DIGNITY ACT 4 (2005). 
 41. See id. at 13–14 (describing characteristics of those who utilized Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act). 
 42. Id. at 13. 
 43. Id. at 13, 20 tbl.1. 
 44. Id. at 20 tbl.1. 
 45. See, e.g., Susan Okie, Physician-Assisted Suicide–Oregon and Beyond, 352 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1627, 1629 (2005); Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and 
Experiences with End-of-Life Care Since Passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 285 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 2363, 2365–66 (2001). 
 46. OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 40, at 4. 
 47. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/2
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all instances in Oregon is a form of barbiturate, the use of which is 
regulated by the CSA.48 Use of barbiturates as a means of hastening 
death, which otherwise is of virtually no consequence for the ethical 
and legal debate over assistance in dying, assumed critical 
significance in the Gonzales v. Oregon litigation.49 The fact that 
substances controlled under the CSA are used to hasten death allowed 
those opposed to legalized assistance in hastening death to attempt to 
utilize the CSA as a means of thwarting the ODWDA. 
B. The Controlled Substances Act and the Gonzales v. Oregon 
Litigation 
The federal government has regulated certain aspects of the 
distribution of drugs deemed susceptible to abuse since the Pure Food 
and Drug Act of 1906.50 The primary contemporary vehicle for 
federal regulation is the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act, enacted in 1970; the CSA is Title II of that Act.51 A 
“controlled” substance is one that is regulated under the CSA.52 The 
CSA classifies controlled substances in five categories or schedules 
based on their potential for abuse, their accepted medical use, and the 
risks associated with their use under medical supervision.53 Schedule 
I substances have a high potential for abuse and have no currently 
accepted use in medical treatment.54 Schedule II through Schedule V 
substances are approved for medical use but are subject to a 
descending hierarchy of restrictions on their use, reflecting the 
likelihood of abuse and the likely degree of harm if abuse occurs.55 
 
 48. OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 40, at 24. 
 49. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 913 (2006). 
 50. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 627, 52 Stat. 1040–1059, 1059. Among other things, the Act 
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of mislabeled or adulterated drugs. Indirectly, 
the Act affected the sale of over-the-counter narcotics, as many consumers became aware for 
the first time that their elixirs contained opium, which was a common ingredient in patent 
medicines of the time. See ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND 663–64 
(1998). 
 51. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801-904 (2000). 
 52. Id. § 802(6). 
 53. Id. § 812. 
 54. Id. § 812(1)(A)-(B). 
 55. See id. § 812(b)(2)-(5). 
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Barbiturates are listed on Schedule II.56 To give a lawful prescription 
for a controlled substance, a physician must be registered with the 
DEA,57 and to be valid under the CSA, such a prescription must be 
issued for “a legitimate medical purpose.”58  
There is little dispute that the primary purposes of the CSA are to 
control drug abuse and to eliminate illicit trafficking in drugs. In 
accomplishing these objectives there is a division of responsibility 
among various federal agencies, in particular the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice. Of 
particular relevance to the controversy in Gonzales v. Oregon is the 
Attorney General’s authority to revoke a physician’s registration for 
prescribing controlled substances if the registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.59 In making this determination 
the Attorney General is directed by the CSA to consider five factors: 
(1) The recommendations of the appropriate State licensing 
board or professional disciplinary authority. (2) The 
applicant’s experience in dispensing, or conducting research 
with respect to controlled substances. (3) The applicant’s 
conviction record under Federal or State laws relating to the 
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled 
substances. (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or 
local laws relating to controlled substances. (5) Such other 
conduct which may threaten the public health and safety.60 
Despite federal laws deterring drug abuse and prohibiting drug 
trafficking, the states have remained the primary, although by no 
means the exclusive, source of most regulation of medical practice. 
Prior to Gonzales the Supreme Court observed that establishing 
“standards of reasonable medical care” is a “quintessential[] state-
law” function.61 States license physicians, establish boards and 
 
 56. See id. § 812(c). 
 57. See id. § 822(a)(c), § 823; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b)(2) (2003) (oversight of 
physician registration delegated to the DEA). 
 58. 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
 59. Id. § 824(a)(4). 
 60. Id. § 823(f). 
 61. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002), overruled in part by 
Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); see also Bowen v. Am. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 645 (1986) (acknowledging that federal regulations governing care of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/2
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agencies to regulate the actions of physicians, and promulgate rules 
and guidelines to which physicians are required to adhere. Indeed, as 
part of their complex regulatory frameworks, all fifty states have their 
own statutes and regulations addressing various aspects of the 
distribution and administration of controlled substances. Many of 
these provisions are more detailed or restrictive than the CSA and its 
accompanying regulations.  
The CSA expressly preserves the primary role of the states in 
regulating most aspects of medical practice; it does not preempt state 
law except where there is a direct conflict between federal and state 
law.62 Under the CSA, however, a state cannot excuse within its 
borders practices that the CSA prohibits.63 
In 1997 various members of Congress voiced their opposition to 
the ODWDA, including then-Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri.64 
Some members of Congress who opposed assistance in hastening 
death asked the DEA to revoke the registration of physicians who 
prescribed drugs under the ODWDA. They contended that the use of 
controlled substances to hasten death is not a legitimate medical 
practice, so prescribing controlled substances for that purpose 
violated the CSA. Then-Attorney General Janet Reno rejected this 
request, reasoning that Oregon had the right to determine what 
constitutes legitimate medical practice within its boundaries.65 
Undeterred, some members introduced the Lethal Drug Abuse 
 
newborns constitute exercise of federal authority in “what would otherwise be the domain of 
state power”); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (“[D]irect control of medical 
practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government.”).  
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 903. This section reads: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of 
Congress to occupy the field . . . to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject 
matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a 
positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that 
the two cannot consistently stand together. 
Id.  
 63. In Gonzales v. Raich the Supreme Court held that the CSA overrides a California state 
law that permits limited growth and use of marijuana for specific medical purposes. 125 S. Ct. 
2195, 2201, 2212–13 (2005). Marijuana is a Schedule I substance under the CSA, and hence 
banned from medical use. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
 64. 143 CONG. REC. 5589–92 (1997). 
 65. Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator (June 5, 
1998), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 105-372, at 9–10 (1998). 
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Prevention Act66 and later the Pain Relief Promotion Act,67 
legislation that would expressly have prohibited the use of controlled 
substances in connection with assistance in hastening death. Both 
proposals failed.  
In 2001 John Ashcroft assumed the top position at the Department 
of Justice. He did not hesitate long in using his new position to 
attempt to nullify the same Oregon statute he had criticized as a 
senator. After obtaining a sympathetic analysis from the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, he issued the November 2001 
Interpretive Rule. However, ultimately his efforts as Attorney 
General were no more successful than his efforts as a legislator. The 
Interpretive Rule never took effect. 
The state of Oregon and individual named plaintiffs, including 
physicians and terminally ill patients, obtained from the district court 
an injunction against implementation of the Interpretive Rule, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.68 In upholding the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme 
Court held that the November 2001 Interpretive Rule was an invalid 
exercise of the Attorney General’s authority under the CSA.69 The 
Court reasoned that the CSA gives the Attorney General limited 
powers and there is no indication, explicit or implicit, in the language 
of the statute that the Attorney General has the authority to define 
what constitutes a legitimate medical practice as long as the practice 
does not implicate drug trafficking or drug abuse as regulated by the 
CSA.70  
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Attorney General has 
authority to issue regulations for the “control” of drugs,71 but 
concluded that the Interpretive Rule could not be characterized as an 
exercise of this authority.72 “Control” is expressly defined under the 
statute to mean adding a drug or other substance to one of the CSA’s 
 
 66. Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998). 
 67. Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 1999). 
 68. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002), aff’d, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 69. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006). 
 70. Id.  
 71. See 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). 
 72. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 925. 
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five schedules.73 Moreover, prior to exercising this authority, the 
Attorney General must follow a specified set of procedures, including 
soliciting scientific and medical evidence.74 As the Court observed, 
the Interpretive Rule “does not concern the scheduling of substances 
and was not issued after the required procedures for rules regarding 
scheduling, so it cannot fall under the Attorney General’s ‘control’ 
authority.”75 
The Court also considered the federal government’s contention 
that the Interpretive Rule represented a valid exercise of authority 
because amendments to the CSA in 1984 broadened the Attorney 
General’s authority to allow him to deny or revoke the registration of 
a physician after concluding that the registration was inconsistent 
with the public interest.76 The Court found multiple flaws in this 
argument. The 1984 amendments required the Attorney General to 
consider the five different factors described above before determining 
that a physician’s registration was inconsistent with the public 
interest.77 The Court found that the Attorney General did “not 
undertake the five-factor analysis” prior to issuing his Interpretive 
Rule.78 The Attorney General’s Interpretive Rule did not even purport 
to be an application of the registration provisions of the CSA. 
Instead, it explicitly stated that it represented “an interpretation of the 
substantive federal law requirements for a valid prescription.”79 
Effectively, the Attorney General’s rule “work[ed] in the opposite 
direction” from that contemplated in the statute.80 He declared the 
issuance of a prescription to assist in hastening death to be criminally 
unlawful under the CSA, thereby automatically “placing in jeopardy 
the registration of any physician” writing a prescription under the 
ODWDA, whereas the CSA requires the Attorney General to 
consider the five specified factors before determining whether a 
 
 73. 21 U.S.C. § 802(5). 
 74. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812.  
 75. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 917. 
 76. Id. at 917–18 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 918. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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physician’s registration should be revoked.81 Only after weighing 
these factors is the Attorney General authorized by the CSA to 
revoke the physician’s registration.82 If the deregistered physician 
then writes an additional prescription for a controlled substance, this 
is a criminal violation of the CSA. The Court reasoned that the 
Attorney General could not utilize the “public interest” factor listed 
in the CSA’s registration provisions to impose his own views about 
what does and does not violate that statute.83  
Finally, the Court addressed the federal government’s argument 
that the CSA’s mandate that prescriptions be issued only for “a 
legitimate medical purpose” necessarily implies that prescriptions 
under the ODWDA are unlawful.84 The government contended that 
intentionally hastening death cannot be part of accepted medical 
practice, which is “a healing or curative art.”85 In response, the Court 
acknowledged that limiting medical care to treatment designed to 
cure a patient is one understanding of “medicine’s boundaries.”86 
However, the Court also pointed out that there are alternative 
understandings of the scope of medicine.87 The CSA does not 
authorize the Attorney General to impose on physicians his particular 
understanding of the practice of medicine.88 
The Court both noted the absence of any statutory warrant for the 
government’s position and emphasized that the implications of that 
position are dangerous.89 It stated that were this interpretation of the 
CSA accepted, the Attorney General’s authority to make medical 
judgments would not be limited to the issue of physician assistance in 
hastening death.90 The Attorney General would have the authority to 
interfere with any medical practice he deemed inappropriate if it 
involved use of controlled substances: “Were [the government’s] 
argument accepted, [the Attorney General] could decide whether any 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 924. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 924–25. 
 88. Id. at 925. 
 89. Id. at 921. 
 90. Id. at 921–22. 
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particular drug may be used for any particular purpose, or indeed 
whether a physician who administers any controversial treatment 
could be deregistered.”91 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the 
CSA does not allow the Attorney General to prohibit physicians from 
prescribing drugs for use in assistance in dying, provided state law 
permits the procedure.92 
II. ASSISTANCE IN DYING AND DEFINING MEDICINE’S BOUNDARIES 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, physician assistance 
in hastening death remains a legal option in Oregon. Obviously, this 
is an important consequence for those who favor laws permitting 
assistance in hastening death. Although obtaining a barbiturate or 
similar drug via a physician’s prescription is not the only way to 
hasten death, it is considered a humane method, is preferred by many 
physicians, and is the one contemplated under the ODWDA. For a 
variety of reasons, including the views of many that physician 
involvement is critical to a patient’s informed decision-making about 
whether to hasten death, it is unlikely that Oregon or any other state 
would have legalized other methods had there been an adverse 
Supreme Court ruling.  
Notably, the Supreme Court decision does not preclude 
congressional action to prohibit at the national level assistance in 
hastening death on the ground that it does not comport with 
legitimate medical practice. Such federal legislation probably would 
be deemed constitutional under the Commerce Clause.93 Although it 
now seems unlikely that such legislation will be considered or 
enacted in the near future, there is the possibility that, given the 
shifting tides of political fortune, such a measure could eventually 
garner support. In the balance of this article we argue that any 
legislation that would prohibit physician assistance in hastening death 
on the ground that it does not fall within the scope of legitimate 
 
 91. Id. at 921. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2207 (2005) (declaring the CSA’s categorical 
prohibition of manufacture and possession of marijuana, a Schedule I substance, is a valid 
exercise of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, even as applied to intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical purposes). 
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medical practice should be rejected. For reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that physician assistance in hastening death is a legitimate 
form of medical care. We also present a principled basis for 
permitting physician assistance in hastening death in states where it 
has not yet been legalized, based on larger principles already 
established in the laws regulating medical practice today.  
A. Assistance in Hastening Death as a Legitimate Form of  
Medical Practice  
We start with the premise that physician assistance in hastening 
death is best viewed as part of a continuum of medical care. A 
physician who encounters a sick patient should initially seek, if 
possible, to rid the patient’s body of injuries, diseases, or related 
infirmities. Restoration of health is morally mandatory as a goal as 
long as there is a reasonable prospect of success and the patient 
supports the means necessary to this end. However, to direct the 
physician to stop at this point and confine the practice of medicine to 
those measures designed to cure diseases or heal injuries is an unduly 
narrow way of thinking about what the physician has to offer the 
patient. The value of physicians is broader.  
When in the patient’s eyes the burdens of continued attempts at a 
cure outweigh their probable benefits, the caring physician, in 
consultation with the patient, should redirect the course of treatment 
so that its primary focus is the relief of pain and suffering. For many 
patients, palliative care with aggressive use of analgesics will prove 
sufficient to accomplish this goal. For other patients, relief of 
intolerable distress or suffering will come only with death, which 
some patients will therefore seek to hasten.94  
To prevent a physician from using her skills to bring comfort and 
relief to a patient on the ground that the measures available are not 
curative is to prevent the physician from meeting what both the 
physician and the patient may consider the physician’s commitment 
 
 94. Again, under the ODWDA, many patients never ingest the drug provided via the 
physician’s prescription. Fear of pain and the loss of bodily functions and autonomy is one of 
the principal causes of distress for many. OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., supra note 40, at 15. 
Knowledge that one can readily escape these dreaded conditions if they become intolerable 
may, by itself, provide sufficient comfort. 
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to and responsibility for her incurably ill patients. This narrow view 
of the practice of medicine is analogous to the clearly incorrect claim 
that the practice of law is confined to measures designed to obtain an 
outright victory in litigation. To the contrary, lawyers often serve 
their clients best by reconciling them to the inevitable, securing a 
negotiated outcome and working with them to ease their passage 
through legal woes. It would be incongruous to claim that a physician 
cannot attend to a patient in analogous caring ways. In both 
professions the goal is the best possible outcome for the client or 
patient, whatever that may be in the informed view of the patient or 
client.  
Many, if not most, contemporary physicians view their practice as 
encompassing assistance in hastening death. A recent survey finds 
that 57% of physicians practicing in the United States today consider 
it ethically permissible to assist a terminally ill, mentally competent 
patient who has made a considered choice to terminate life in order to 
avoid unbearable suffering.95 Other studies find similar support 
among a plurality of physicians.96 The pages of respected medical 
journals also demonstrate that a significant number of physicians 
today consider assistance in hastening death to be squarely within the 
bounds of legitimate medical practice, whether the patient’s 
motivation is the alleviation of physical pain or relief from profound 
suffering.97 This support by physicians themselves for inclusion of 
assistance in hastening death within the scope of their practice, while 
not dispositive of this issue, demonstrates that claims that assistance 
in hastening death is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s 
 
 95. Louis Finkelstein Institute for Religious and Social Research, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide Survey, http://www.jtsa.edu/research/finkelstein/surveys/pas.shtml (last visited Sept. 
12, 2006).  
 96. See Karen D. Novielli et al., Correlates of Physicians’ Endorsement of the 
Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 75 ACAD. MED. 53 (2000). 
 97. See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of 
Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and 
Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2099 (1997) (discussing end-of-life 
options and contending that, in certain circumstances, assistance in hastening death is 
appropriate medical care); Timothy E. Quill & Christine K. Cassel, Professional Organizations’ 
Position Statements on Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Case for Studied Neutrality, 138 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 208 (2003) (summarizing views of physicians and observing that many 
professional medical organizations do not view assisted suicide or hastening death as 
inappropriate), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/138/3/208.pdf. 
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role are based on the speaker’s own viewpoint rather than on most 
contemporary physicians’ self-perception.98 
There are prudential reasons for permitting physicians to provide 
such assistance legally and publicly. First, if physicians are barred 
from providing assistance lawfully, some patients will resort to self-
help in causing their own deaths, with adverse consequences. A few, 
being concerned about waiting until it is “too late” (that is, until they 
lack the physical or mental ability to hasten their own deaths), will 
end their lives prematurely. If they had access to the security of a 
lethal drug, they might find their situation bearable and continue to 
live until a natural death arrives. As one perceptive commentator has 
observed: “If the only choice is suicide now and suffering later, 
individuals will frequently choose suicide now. . . . The possibility of 
physician-assisted suicide enables them to wait until they have more 
information before deciding whether to live or die.”99 
Alternatively, some patients will seek and obtain covert assistance 
from physicians. Although statistics regarding covert assistance are 
elusive given the illegality of the practice, available evidence 
indicates that a substantial number of physicians provide such 
assistance in secret at least once in their careers.100 This assistance, 
which takes place with the involvement of as few individuals as 
possible, is more susceptible to abuse than a practice that is open and 
regulated. A regulatory scheme that minimizes the chance that 
patients will be manipulated or coerced into dying also diminishes the 
risk that they will make an ill-advised choice while cognitively 
impaired or experiencing depression, and it encourages them to live 
as long as they find their lives worthwhile. For this reason alone, a 
 
 98. Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 931–32 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 247–48 (1995). 
 100. See, e.g., Ezekiel Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public, 347 LANCET 
1805, 1808 (1996) (in one study half of oncologists surveyed had received a request for assisted 
death, and 13.6% had complied); Diane E. Meier et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1195 (1998) (11% 
of physicians polled reported that, even under current legal constraints, there are circumstances 
in which they would prescribe a medication for a competent patient to use with the primary 
intention of ending his or her life); Lee R. Slome et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Patients 
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Disease, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 417, 419 (1997) (53% of 
117 Bay-area physicians specializing in the care of patients with AIDS indicated that they had 
acceded at least once to a request to hasten death). 
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scheme that allows physicians to provide legal assistance in hastening 
death is preferable to a total ban on that assistance. 
Some who contend that assistance in hastening death lies outside 
the boundaries of medical practice rely on a mechanical and 
telescoped concept of the physician’s role. Under this view, assisting 
a patient to die does not make use of medical skills or judgment, but 
rather consists only of utilizing technical knowledge about how to 
cause a patient’s death.101 These arguments treat assistance in 
hastening death as if it begins and ends with a doctor’s prescription of 
a lethal dose of medication. This view of the physician’s role is again 
too narrow.  
A physician who assists a patient in hastening his or her death is 
not a mere technician, nor does this physician provide services that 
could be provided, just as easily and competently, by a layperson. 
Sensitive physicians use the full extent of their professional training 
and experience when they assess the patient’s condition and 
determine whether the patient is terminally ill; they assess the 
prospects for effective palliative care for the patient through a 
meaningful dialogue with the patient; they evaluate what alternatives 
may be feasible and acceptable to the patient; they determine whether 
the patient is competent to make a decision regarding the course of 
treatment; they ensure that the patient’s judgment is not impaired by 
depression or other factors; and they consult with other physicians to 
confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis, the exhaustion of other 
alternatives, and the competence of the patient. To be performed 
well, these activities all require the experience, knowledge, and skills 
of the physician.  
Although physician assistance in hastening death is not 
universally accepted as a legitimate medical practice, neither is its 
acceptance an eccentric or novel view. Because the Hippocratic Oath 
 
 101. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: IN SEARCH OF A 
PEACEFUL DEATH 110 (Georgetown Univ. Press 2000) (stating that a doctor does not use 
medical standards in deciding whether to provide assistance in hastening death); Leon R. Kass, 
I Will Give No Deadly Drug: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 77 AM. C. SURGEONS BULL. 6 (1992) 
(noting that “killing” is not part of the physician’s art); see also AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF 
MED. ETHICS R. 2.211 (1998) (declaring that physician-assisted suicide is incompatible with the 
physician’s role). 
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instructs physicians not to provide a “deadly drug,”102 some have 
concluded that physicians, by their training and moral commitment, 
must necessarily reject assistance in hastening death.103 This is not so. 
The provision in the Hippocratic Oath that prohibits providing a 
deadly drug did not even reflect accepted medical practice in ancient 
Greek city-states where, upon request, a physician could provide a 
lethal drug for a suffering patient.104 In some sense, physicians who 
provide assistance in hastening death are adhering to a longstanding 
understanding of the scope of medical practice: to care for and meet 
the needs and desires of a patient in all stages of the patient’s life. 
Significantly, the activities a physician undertakes in providing 
assistance in hastening death are the same as those often carried out 
by a physician who oversees a withdrawal of treatment.105 As a 
purely medical matter, there is little to distinguish a physician’s 
activities in withdrawing treatment from activities in hastening death 
through other means. 
B. The Inadequacy of the Distinction Between “Letting Die”  
and “Killing”  
Those who reject physician assistance in hastening death often 
attempt to distinguish between overseeing a refusal of treatment and 
what they characterize as assisting in a suicide.106 They attempt 
further to ground this distinction in what they describe as the 
 
 102. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT MEDICINE 6 (Owsei Temkin & C. Lilian Temkin eds., 
1967).  
 103. See Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love Nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, PUB. 
INT., Winter 1989, at 25, 37–41. 
 104. EDELSTEIN, supra note 102, at 11–13. Moreover, most medical schools have not used 
the Hippocratic Oath in its original form for decades. Robert D. Orr & Norman Pang, The Use 
of the Hippocratic Oath: A Review of Twentieth Century Practice and a Content Analysis of 
Oaths Administered in Medical Schools in the U.S. and Canada in 1993, 8 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 
377 (1997). Currently, only six of 122 medical schools in the United States administer an oath 
that would prohibit physician assistance in hastening death. Audiey C. Kao & Kayhan P. Parsi, 
Content Analyses of Oaths Administered at U.S. Medical Schools in 2000, 79 ACAD. MED. 882 
(2004). 
 105. We say “often carried out” because given the widespread acceptance of withdrawal of 
treatment, there is relatively little scrutiny of what most physicians actually do in such 
situations. 
 106. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED 
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 109–13, 146–48 (1994). 
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difference between “letting die” and “killing.” This distinction 
between letting die and killing is applied to distinguish between 
practices considered permissible under certain conditions from 
practices that should always be condemned. Withdrawals or 
withholdings of treatment have often been classified in the “letting 
die” category, depending on the nature of the illness and the intent of 
the physician although not always depending on the wishes of the 
patient.107 This distinction between killing and letting die has long 
been the most critical one in attempts in law and moral philosophy to 
distinguish appropriate from inappropriate means to death.  
However, the distinction between “killing” and “letting die” is not 
a reliable way to distinguish impermissible from permissible acts. It 
is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, not least because it tends to 
mask, rather than promote, consideration of the relevant factors that 
ought to be considered in determining permissible conduct. For 
example, we believe that withdrawing treatment from a competent 
patient is not morally justifiable unless the patient has made an 
informed decision authorizing this withdrawal. If a physician 
removes a respirator from a patient who needs it and wants to 
continue to use it, the action is wrong, even though the physician has 
only removed artificial life support and let nature take its course. 
Absent the patient’s authorization, such “letting die” is simply 
killing. The lack of authorization by the patient is the relevant 
consideration in assessing the act as unacceptable. Focusing on the 
distinction between letting die and killing obscures what should be 
the determinative factor in evaluating the physician’s conduct: the 
patient’s decision.  
A physician’s validly authorized nonintervention in circumstances in 
which the patient dies as a result is appropriate where the physician is 
following the patient’s instruction. The physician is not the relevant 
cause of death and does not act wrongly if he or she has valid 
authorization for withholding or withdrawing treatment. By contrast, 
comparable action or inaction is inappropriate in medicine if a physician 
has a duty to treat but the physician withholds or withdraws, without 
patient authorization, a life-sustaining technology, and the patient 
 
 107. Gostin, supra note 16, at 95.  
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subsequently dies for lack of the technology. A physician is the relevant 
cause of death, and thereby acts wrongly, if he or she has no valid 
authorization from the patient to withhold or withdraw treatment.  
Of course, physicians also may use a so-called “active” means to 
bring about death. Some would argue that use of any “active” means 
necessarily results in an inappropriate “killing.” But there are several 
problems inherent in the idea that we can determine appropriate and 
inappropriate conduct by considering whether an active means to death 
was involved. This is especially true in the context of the ODWDA, 
where the distinction between “letting die” and “killing” is not helpful 
in determining appropriate and inappropriate physician conduct. 
Physicians who act under the ODWDA do not “kill” patients in any 
meaningful sense. A physician who prescribes a lethal medication at a 
patient's request is simply writing a prescription. That act no more 
“kills” a person than does the writing of a prescription for sedatives or 
analgesics for a patient who is undergoing withdrawal of treatment. 
Under the ODWDA, the patient must make a conscious decision to use 
the drug. About one-third of the patients who seek a prescription under 
the ODWDA never ingest the lethal drug; others ingest it months after it 
has been prescribed. For those who do take the drug, the physician’s 
writing of the prescription is a necessary step in the process that leads to 
the patient’s death, but it is not the determinative or even the final step. 
Under any reasonable interpretation of the term, the Oregon physician 
does not “kill” the patient. Nor, however, does this physician “let the 
patient die.” Use of the terms “letting die” and “killing” is simply not an 
illuminating way to view what happens when a physician provides a 
patient who so requests with the means to escape the ravages of a fatal 
illness.  
One can understand the initial appeal of the letting die/killing 
distinction. It has deep roots in English tort law, which made unwanted 
touchings actionable.108 Moreover, killings are rarely authorized by the 
victim, and cases of letting-die generally are validly authorized. But the 
frequency with which one kind of act is justified, by contrast to the 
other kind of act, should not determine whether either kind of act can 
ever be legally or morally justified.  
 
 108. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (discussing touching 
under common law). 
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C. Resolving Disputes Between Different Models of Medical Practice 
It is undeniable that the physician-as-healer model of medical 
practice derives from a resilient tradition that retains considerable 
support today, both in the medical community and among the public 
at large. The reasons it enjoys such support are understandable: it is 
in some ways a comfortable view and it avoids confrontation of some 
difficult issues. However, this model no longer appears to be the 
dominant view, either in the medical community or among the public. 
We have supported a very different model, the continuum-of-care 
model, that takes a broader view of the range of activities legitimate 
for physicians. It is likely that both models will continue to enjoy 
significant support in the years to come. How, then, should we 
resolve disputes between these inherently contestable models? Is 
there any way other than sheer political muscle? Can the models co-
exist?  
The key issue is how to determine the goals of regulation. 
Fortunately, the historical record may provide useful direction. 
Regulatory questions regarding whether a particular action serves a 
legitimate medical purpose are not new. Historically these disputes 
have focused on whether a proposed treatment is safe and effective. 
These disputes continue today, as the controversies over various 
forms of alternative medicine illustrate. In resolving such disputes, 
regulatory bodies, be they federal or state, have not only looked at the 
implications for patients receiving the disputed drug, device, or 
treatment, but also at implications for society as a whole. Two of the 
principal motivations for the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, the 
first federal law addressing health care, were to ensure that drugs 
were not adulterated and that consumers received important 
information about the contents of available drugs.109 This measure 
reduced the risk to consumers from impure, unsafe drugs and had the 
effect of improving confidence in manufactured drugs and 
medications, thereby creating a market for responsible drug 
manufacturers. Similarly, in evaluating disputed practices today, from 
 
 109. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2202 (2005); see Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism 
and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 794 n.47 (2004) (Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 
required disclosure of narcotics in medications). 
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xenotransplantation110 to genetic therapies, a critical question is the 
effect the practice will have not only on patients receiving the care 
but on society as a whole. Will the welfare of many be adversely 
affected by tolerance of the benefits afforded others by the practice?  
We urge that similar considerations of public health and safety be 
utilized for adjudicating normative disputes about appropriate 
restrictions on a physician’s actions in caring for terminally ill 
patients. Protection of the health and safety of both patients and the 
public is a presumptively legitimate goal and well-established in the 
laws regulating medicine. The question we should ask is this: Is the 
proposed restriction necessary to protect the public from 
consequences that are regarded as serious and adverse by all or 
almost all? In the context of assistance in hastening death, the 
question becomes, is prohibition necessary to ensure that those who 
wish to die naturally are not tricked, maneuvered, or otherwise 
manipulated into ending their lives earlier? Might legalization reduce 
opportunities for effective palliative care, to the detriment of many? 
Concerns that legalizing assistance in hastening death might result 
in serious harms, especially for those not seeking such assistance, 
have been raised by many opposed to assistance in hastening death. If 
legalization were to bring about unwarranted, involuntary deaths, 
reduce the quality of palliative care, result in deep-seated and 
widespread mistrust of physicians, and so on, then we agree that 
these consequences would support arguments against legalizing 
physician assistance in hastening death. However, none of these 
consequences has come to pass in the only state that has legalized 
physician assistance in dying.111 Moreover, it appears that the quality 
of palliative care has improved more quickly in Oregon than 
 
 110. “Xenotransplantation” is the transplantation of cells, tissues, or organs from 
nonhumans to humans. See F.H. Bach et al., Uncertainty in Xenotransplantation: Individual 
Benefit Versus Collective Risk, in  ETHICAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 341 (Richard Sherlock 
& John D. Morrey eds., 2002). 
 111. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. Although Oregon’s experience 
strongly suggests that other jurisdictions could legalize assistance in hastening death without 
significant adverse consequences, it certainly provides no guarantee this would be the case. 
This, of course, is one argument in favor of adopting a state-by-state approach to assistance in 
hastening death. Only through experiences with various states will we be able to determine 
whether opponents’ concerns about legalization have any empirical basis anywhere.  
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elsewhere.112 Accordingly, there is currently no empirical basis for 
concluding that prohibiting physician assistance in hastening death 
would protect the public health and safety. 
Clearly, some terminally ill patients, those who seek prescriptions 
under the ODWDA, are enabled by the statute to exercise control 
over the time and manner of death. The public health and safety of 
these patients is served by legalization and the strict procedural 
safeguards contained in the Oregon statute. There is no 
countervailing harm to others in the state. The only effect of the 
statute on them seems to have been a benefit: increased attention to 
end-of-life care, with a resulting improvement in palliative care. 
Thus, the public health and safety of the community as a whole is 
served by legalization of physician assistance in hastening death 
accompanied by procedural safeguards. 
Neither those who are convinced for moral, religious, or medical-
traditional reasons that medical practice must be confined to some 
model of “healing,” nor those who are convinced, for distinct moral, 
religious, or other reasons, that there should be no restrictions on 
patient autonomy, especially in the context of end-of-life care, will 
likely be persuaded by our proposal. However, focusing on public 
health and safety is the only way that we see to define the limits of 
medical care without turning this issue into a political football. One 
does not have to be a moral skeptic to know that there is no popularly 
accepted decision-making procedure for determining whether one 
well-defended moral argument is more rationally persuasive than 
another. Uncertainty about different normative conclusions is only 
exacerbated when the dispute encompasses the regulation of an 
important, respected, and influential profession and restrictions on 
patients’ rights.113  
We recommend the following general principle for regulation of 
medical practice: neither the states nor the federal government should 
limit the type of care physicians provide their patients in the absence 
 
 112. See supra note 45. 
 113. Both before and after the decision in Gonzales v. Oregon, much attention has been 
given to the allocation of regulatory authority between federal and state governments with 
respect to the regulation of medical practice. This is an important issue, but, in our view, a 
secondary one. Certainly, no invocation either of states’ rights or of the need for uniform 
federal regulation will resolve debates over the limits that should be placed on medical practice.  
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of evidence that the practice at issue poses a significant threat to the 
health and safety of the public.114 Utilizing this standard avoids 
unresolvable disputes about the goals or ends of medicine while 
ensuring that legitimate public concerns are taken into account. 
Under this standard, there is no sound basis for state or federal 
legislation that would prevent physicians from assisting patients in 
hastening their deaths pursuant to the provisions like those of the 
ODWDA. 
CONCLUSION 
Assistance in hastening death is controversial and is likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future. The debate is particularly 
difficult to resolve because the two sides argue from sharply 
divergent views about the appropriate role of physicians. Attempts to 
end the debate over, and the experiments with, legalized assistance in 
hastening death by imposing a restrictive model of medical practice, 
either through executive fiat or legislation, would needlessly sacrifice 
the benefits derived from legal assistance in hastening death. The 
touchstone for decisions over legalization should not be whether 
assistance in hastening death can be characterized as “healing” or 
“letting die,” but whether legalization causes significant harm to the 
public health and safety. The Oregon experience demonstrates that 
the health and safety of the citizens of that state have been protected, 
and even promoted, by legalization of physician assistance in dying. 
 
 114. Note that our proposed standard is similar to one of the five factors that the Attorney 
General is required to consider under the CSA prior to revoking the registration of a physician. 
21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2000) (stating that the Attorney General must consider threats to public 
health and safety). Thus, it finds a firm foundation in the established statutory scheme 
regulating medical practice. 
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